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Abstract: We study the role of financial advisors in M&A for different advisor engagement 
constellations. We observe positive effects of both target and acquirer advisors on deal 
completion and prices. The unexpected positive price effect of acquirer advisors is further 
supported by evidence for higher premia and lower announcement bidder returns. We establish 
causality of pricing effects using matching and instrumental-variable approaches, making use 
of the impact of Lehman’s collapse on former Lehman clients. We explain our findings in terms 





 Target financial advisor engagement leads to higher prices and premia, and to lower 
announcement returns. 
 Acquirer financial advisor engagement also leads to higher prices and premia, and lower 
announcement returns. 
 Both target and acquirer advisors increase transaction completion rates. 
 Price effect of acquirer advisors can be explained by weak governance.  
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The decision to engage an advisor is a central question in any mergers and acquisition process. 
The decision is affected by the different parties’ expectations regarding advisors’ effects on 
deal completion and the resulting prices, premia paid, and returns achieved. This paper provides 
evidence on how advisor engagement on both sides of the transaction is associated with deal 
completion, as well as relative deal pricing and premia: do target (“sell side”) financial advisors 
achieve higher prices and premia for sellers? Do acquirer (“buy side”) financial advisors 
achieve lower prices and support negotiating lower acquisition premia for buyers? We also 
assess the effect of advisor engagement on cumulative abnormal announcement returns. We 
establish a framework to discuss how client objectives to both optimize deal pricing and secure 
transactions might be a source of value destruction.  
Mergers & Acquisitions (“M&A”) describes the process of acquiring assets, an entire 
firm, or an operating business of a firm, from another party. Throughout the process of 
identifying, analyzing, and negotiating an M&A transaction as a buyer or seller, financial 
advisors can be hired to facilitate the process by providing services along technical expertise in 
valuation, negotiation expertise and industry knowledge. Advisor roles encompass M&A 
management, including the initiation and subsequent coordination of transaction parties’ 
management meetings and negotiations, often as the counterpart to the advisors on the other 
side of transactions. In this role as “orchestrator” the financial advisor usually also supports 
coordination of other advisors, such as the client’s legal, tax or strategic advisors.  
On the sell-side, clients usually demand support in the identification of potential buyers, 
preparation of the key selling document, the information memorandum, which includes a 
detailed description of the target’s strategic and financial position, also in particular the 





of the seller is expecting to achieve in the next three to five years. Projections are modeled 
based on assumptions for macroeconomic, volume, price and cost drivers and impediments. 
Due to the sensitivity of discounted cash flow models with respect to the assumptions for such 
financial line items and also to assumptions about weighted average cost of capital and terminal 
growth rates, a thorough triangulation of the set of assumptions is one of the primary goals of 
the buyer. Therefore, buy-side financial advisors support not only the identification of the M&A 
target, but also deliver essential commercial and financial due diligence services, which refer 
to the validation of the seller’s price expectation based on the management business case shared 
with the potential buyer.  
Ultimately, firms acquiring an asset are obliged to create value for shareholders and are 
thus required to close transactions at a price that allows them to realize gains from potential 
synergies with the existing assets of the firm. This leads to the expectation that the engagement 
of an acquirer financial advisor is associated with comparatively lower prices, thus paying 
relatively lower premia and achieving higher announcement returns. Similarly, the management 
of the acquisition target should hire a financial advisor to obtain services to optimize the 
transaction from their perspective, viz., achieving comparatively higher prices by negotiating 
higher selling premia, leading to lower bidder returns. Both sides may be interested in 
improving the likelihood of deal completion and cumulative abnormal returns of the merged 
entity by using an advisor.  
To better understand the incentive structure of financial advisors, McLaughlin (1990) 
studies the structure of investment banking contracts. He observes that advisors are incentivized 
by a high share of the total advisor fee being conditional upon successful completion of the deal 
(making up about 80% of total fee). He also documents that this feature exists for both sell-side 
and buy-side advisors. This is interesting in the light of a missing contractual incentive for 





executives to invest shareholders’ equity efficiently.  Rau (2000) examined the determinants of 
the market share of investment banks acting as advisors, finding that it is positively related to 
the contingent fee payments charged by the bank and the completion rate of transactions 
achieved. The pressure on financial advisors to gain market share might thus exacerbate the 
consequences of the missing incentive for lowering prices. Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) 
investigate deal completion in the context of top tier advisors. They find that top-tier advisors 
are more likely to complete deals and to complete them in less time than lower tier advisors, 
while synergistic gains realized by acquirers declined when top advisors were used. This 
observation can be interpreted in terms of clients sacrificing synergistic gains, thus shareholder 
value, for higher deal completion likelihood: buyers and their advisors seem to focus strongly 
on deal completion. Consistent with these results, Ismail (2010) finds in a sample of U.S. M&A 
deals that tier-one advisors destroy substantial value for their clients, and Hayward (2003) 
shows that financial advisors derive power over their clients from specialized expertise, leading 
them towards complex solutions with potentially adverse outcomes. 
Sleptsov et al. (2013) suggest that exclusive buy-side advisor engagement decreases 
expected acquisition performance and emphasize the importance of competition between 
acquirer advisors. Agrawal, Cooper, Lian and Wang (2013) examined the effect of common 
advisors in M&A transactions (i.e., advisors that are mandated by both buyer and seller for the 
transaction at the same time), finding that transactions with common advisors take longer to 
complete and provide lower premiums to the sellers than deals without common advisors. They 
argue that common advisors are somewhat better for acquirers, because in such an engagement 
constellation the acquiring client is the “surviving” entity that could hire the advisor in the 
future again. Agrawal et al. (2018) investigate the determinants and deal valuation 
consequences of private sellers’ choice of hiring M&A advisors or top-tier advisors. They find 





result is consistent with our findings for sell-side advisors. While Agrawal et al. (2018) examine 
the effects of advisor engagement on deal pricing for private sellers only, the current paper 
studies the effect of advisor engagement on both the buy-side and the sell-side, in publicly and 
privately held targets. We study both deal pricing and completion rates. Observation of 
completion rates allows us to study both relevant dimensions of an M&A transaction, deal 
pricing and deal completion, in the same data sample. We aim to identify general principles for 
the effects of advisors on M&A outcomes, and relate these to governance issues in the context 
of executives’ financial incentives and careers paths. We will argue that top executives have 
strong financial incentives to secure potentially overpriced deals. Similarly, lower tier 
executives may substantially benefit in career terms form pushing costly deals to completion: 
involvement in successful mergers has become a career accelerator (Botelho et al., 2018), if not 
precondition for reaching the C-Suite (Groysberg et al., 2011).  
The literature suggests that, despite many mergers being efficient, overpricing and value 
destruction from the acquirers’ shareholders’ perspective is prevalent in M&A deals (Andrade 
et al., 2001; Moeller et al., 2004; Renneboog and Vansteenkiste, 2019). Executives’ 
overconfidence and hubris have been shown an important cause of overpayment for acquisition 
targets (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; John et al., 2010; Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Roll, 
1986). We suggest an additional perspective by considering self-interest of top executives to 
maximize their bonuses, which are reflected in the contractual terms they close with advisors. 
Grinstein and Hribar (2003) find that approximately 39% of acquiring firms reward their CEOs 
for successful completion of a merger or acquisition deal (M&A bonus). Further, the authors 
suggest that CEOs receive higher M&A bonuses when deals are larger, observing that CEOs 
effort and skill do not explain a significant amount of the variation in the bonus. In addition, 
they find that M&A bonuses do not appear to be linked to deal performance. Grinstein and 





from shareholders through additional bonuses, may lead to self-serving behavior at the costs of 
shareholders equity. Jeongil et al.’s (2015) results point in a similar direction, showing that 
CEOs with below-average pay engage more often in acquisition activity, in order to realign 
their pay with that of their peers. The governance-problems based framework is further 
supported by recent insights into private versus public acquirers. Golubov and Xiong (2020) 
show that private acquirers pay lower prices for targets and have a better post-acquisition 
performance. They show that the different governance arrangements in private firms contribute 
to the observed effects. Wang, Xie and Zhang (2020) find that acquirers create higher 
shareholder returns when advised by investment banks with more experience in the target 
industry. Chang, Shekhar, Tam, and Yao (2013) also examine the role of financial advisors play 
in M&A, and focus on the industry expertise of the acquirer advisor, finding that industry 
expertise is associated with higher deal completion but not with any valuation effects of 
acquisitions. Similarly, Chang et al. (2016) focus on the role that financial advisors provide in 
M&A by focusing on acquirers that hire the target’s ex-advisors. They find that these advisors 
pay lower takeover premiums and secure a larger proportion of merger synergies. 
Becher, Cohn, and Juergens (2015) study determinants of deal completion. They find 
that the probability of completion increases with the favorability of acquirer analyst 
recommendations and decreases with the favorability of target analyst recommendations. They 
argue that these effects are driven by the effects of recommendations on the target shareholders 
willingness to accept the deal. In cross border mergers with US acquirers, Francis, Hasan, and 
Sun (2014) find that shareholders care more about the advisor being US-based than having 
experience in the target country. They argue that the certification is most important for 
shareholders. In the current paper we zoom out and analyze transactions across various 
industries and countries. M&A is a global business, and contractual incentives are very 





We provide an empirical analysis of historical transaction data from Thomson Reuters SDC 
Platinum, examining 35,979 initiated M&A transactions between 1978 and 2020. Our analysis 
proceeds as follows. We first show that advisors on either side of the transaction correlate 
positively with prices, premia, and deal completion likelihood. Further, we find that both 
advisors, i.e.,  also the buy-side advisors, are significantly negatively associated with bidder 
returns, adding to our observation that advisors might destroy value for the buy-side. We next 
consider the potential causality problem arising from endogenous advisor engagement. We first 
apply a matching procedure to compare similar deals with and without an advisor. We find 
robust evidence for a causal link between advisor engagement and deal completion, prices, 
premia, and bidder returns for both acquirers and targets. We next apply an instrumental 
variable approach, using advisor clients affected by the Lehman failure to instrument for 
endogenous advisor engagement. The IV analysis confirms the surprising positive causal effect 
of acquirer advisors on prices.  We shed some more light on the underlying mechanism of 
positive acquirer price advisor price effects by comparing listed and non-listed firms and by 
looking at differences in bargaining power.  
Our different ways to address the question provide converging evidence that advisers 
cause increases in price and premia both on the sell-side (as expected, create value for owners) 
and buy-side (potentially destroy value for acquirer shareholders). But advisor engagement on 
both sides also increases deal completion likelihood. In our sample, 55% of the transactions 
involve an acquirer advisor, and 62% of the transactions involve a target advisor. Thus, from 
the perspective of the acquirer shareholders, advisor engagement may increase the risk that 
value is destroyed in an acquisition. From the perspective of the target shareholders, it is, in 
contrast, surprising that only 62% take up the opportunity for a better and more secure deal with 






2. Data and Methodology  
2.1. Data 
We use Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database on mergers and acquisitions transactions to 
gather all reported initiated M&A transactions during 1978 and 2020. Data is sourced through 
direct deal submissions from global banking and legal contributors coupled with extensive 
research performed by a global research team, collecting data from regulatory filings, corporate 
statements, media, and pricing wires. According to Thomson Reuters, more than 2,500 control 
validations occur at the point of data entry. We focus on transactions with a deal size above $ 
0.5m and exclude transactions with negative Ebitda Margin or Ebitda Margin larger than 1 and 
negative Sales Absolute (technically defined below)1, but otherwise make use of the full data 
set. Contracts with advisors in full scope transactions are rather comparable to transactions of 
partial set of assets. Moreover, contract structure in terms of variable and fix components are 
comparable across different client industries and countries (Lessem and Wright, 2019). We 
further include additional data sets on stocks and indexes from CRSP (Center for Research in 
Security Prices) to compute cumulative abnormal announcement returns, since this data is not 
included in our main data set (Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum).  
2.2. Variables 
The key variables of interest in this study are the relative deal price, premia paid, and the deal 
completion status. We also provide analyses of bidder returns. To construct a measure of 
relative deal pricing, we make use of the Deal Size, i.e. the selling price, and the target’s next 
twelve months earnings forecast, Ebitda Absolute, in the year of the transaction. Ebitda 
Absolute is a profitability indicator defined by the absolute amount of earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation, and amortization (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Ebitda Absolute and Deal 
                                                          
1 Firms with a negative Ebitda Margin and negative Sales Absolute are excluded from our analysis as Ebitda 
Multiple is not a robust valuation indicator for such assets. We exclude in total 607 initiated transactions due to 





Size values are reported in U.S. dollars. We measure relative deal price using the Ebitda 
Multiple, defined as the ratio of Deal Size to Ebitda Absolute of the M&A target. It is a measure 
to indicate relative deal pricing in M&A transactions that is widely used in the context of M&A 
or valuing businesses in general (Loughran and Wellman, 2011; Damodaran, 2005; Koller, 
Goedhart, and Wessels, 2010). The Ebitda Multiple allows to compare negotiated deal terms 
regardless of the size of the M&A target. This is essential in our analysis as we observe a high 
variation of transaction and firm sizes in our data set. Because of the highly skewed distribution 
of the Ebitda Multiple, we transform it into its logarithm, indicated by the variable Ebitda 
Multiple (Log), in our analyses. We define the premia paid by acquirers, Premium 1 Day, 
Premium 1 Week and Premium 1 Month, as the difference between the offer price and the 
target’s closing stock price 1 day (1 week; 1 month) prior to the original announcement date, 
expressed as a percentage. To account for outliers, we winsorize the premia at level 1% and 
99%. Premia are available in the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum data.  
We measure bidder cumulative absolute returns with the variables CAR(-1/+1), CAR(-
2/+2), CAR(-3/+3), and CA4 (-4/+4).  We use CRSP database to model Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR). We estimate the model over a 255-day window ending 46 days prior to the 
announcement date, using CRSP Value Weighted Index as our market proxy. We report CAR 
over a 3-, 5-,7- and 9-day window.  Further, Deal Status is registered in the data set with five 
possible status levels: Deal completed, deal pending, deal intended, deal withdrawn, and other 
deal status. For our analysis, we create the dummy variable Deal Completed, coded as one if 
Deal Status equals “deal completed,” and zero else.   
The presence of target advisors or acquirer advisors is measured by binary indicators. 
The variable Target Advisor is one in case a target advisor was reported and zero otherwise, 
and the variable Acquirer Advisor is one in case an acquirer advisor was reported and zero 





variables in our study. Specific demands of clients vary, thus not all services described are 
contracted, as laid out in detail in the Introduction. As indicated by McLaughlin (1990), advisor 
contracts are typically structured with a fixed payment and a contingent payment upon 
successful deal completion depending on deal size (approximately 80% of the total advisor fee). 
Acquirer advisors, typically also investment banks and management consultants, manage the 
buy-side process, which includes deal sourcing through identification of M&A targets, target 
screening (a first filter of relevant M&A targets regarding strategic and financial fit), drafting 
indicative offers, due diligence and support in preparation of negotiation, signing and closing 
of deals. Contracts of buy side advisors are structured also with a high variable payment 
contingent upon deal completion, raising substantial governance concerns about the missing 
incentive to negotiate prices down.   
Given the heterogeneity of our sample of transactions, we include a set of control 
variables. These include the size of the M&A target, defined by the variable Sales Absolute 
measured in U.S. dollars. We transform Sales Absolute into its logarithm, indicated by the 
variable Sales Absolute (Log), because of its highly skewed distribution. Further, we use the 
profitability of the M&A target, defined by the variable Ebitda Margin, which is calculated by 
annual Ebitda Absolute over annual Sales Absolute. We add further controls at the level of the 
deal: Deal Attitude (indicated by dummy variables “friendly”, “neutral” or “hostile” attitude of 
the acquirer towards the seller), the Form of the Transaction (indicated by dummy variables 
“acquisition”, “merger” or “other form of transaction”) and the Target Public Status (indicated 
by dummy variables “public”, “private” and “other public status”). To account for potential 
information asymmetry between acquirer and seller due to geographical distance or industry 
specialization (Uysal et al., 2008), we add the dummy variables Same Country (coded one if 





Industry (coded as one if the acquirer and seller operate in the same industry and zero else).  
Finally, we include target country, year, and industry fixed effects. 
Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study for two sub 
samples, Completed Transactions (Table 1) and Incomplete Transactions (Table 2). They 
summarize data on transactions financials, on the status of the M&A targets, and on the 
properties of the deal along two time periods, 1978 to 1999, and 2000 to 2020. We split our 
sample in two time periods in order capture potential time effects beyond the use of year fixed 
effects. For the entire sample, the average Ebitda Multiple equals 19.5. The average Deal Size 
is almost $ 719m, while average Sales Absolute are about $ 730m. 81% of the initiated 
transactions in our sample are completed. 
< Table 1 > 
< Table 2 > 
Table 3 shows summary statistics of key variables of interest, segmented along the different 
advisor engagement constellations we consider: TA+AA+ (Advisors engaged on both sides), 
TA-AA+ (only acquirer advisor is engaged), TA+AA- (only target advisor is engaged), and 
TA-AA- (no advisor is engaged). The raw numbers show that deal completion is positively 
associated with advisor presence. Moreover, both target and acquirer advisor engagement seem 
to be positively associated with realized Ebitda Multiples.  In the next section we will 
systematically assess these associations. The following section will then consider the causality 
underlying the relationships. 







3. Main Result: Association of Advisor Engagement with Relative Deal Pricing, 
Premia, Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Deal Completion 
In this section we establish our main results regarding the association of advisor engagement 
with deal pricing, premia, cumulative abnormal returns, and deal completion likelihood. We 
split our sample in two time periods, 1978 to 1999 and 2000 to 2020, investigating advisor 
effects across industries and countries. Table 4 shows the results for deal pricing, premia paid 
and CARs in the time period 1978 through 1999. Multivariate regression analysis with a full 
set of controls and country, year, and industry fixed effects of Ebitda Multiples on advisor 
dummies in model (1) shows a positive correlation of both target and acquirer advisor with 
pricing multiples. Models (2) to (4) show no significant association of either  advisor with 
acquisition premia paid. Models (5) to (8) analyze the correlation of CAR with advisor 
presence. We find that target advisor presence is significantly negative correlated with CARs 
for the 3-day and 5-day window. We observe a weakly significant negative association of the 
acquirer advisor with CAR for the 3-day window. F-Tests show that there is a significant 
difference between coefficients of target advisor and acquirer advisor in terms of Ebitda 
Multiples (stronger effect for acquirer advisor, F=2, 946, p<0.001), but no significant difference 
between Premia and CARs. 
In Table 5, we conduct the same analysis for the time period 2000 to 2020, confirming 
results for Ebitda Multiples. Moreover, we find a strong and positive association between both 
advisors and the premia paid. In this later period there is significant evidence for a negative 
association of announcement returns with target advisors for all event windows, and also a 
significantly negative association with acquirer advisors for the three-day window. The 
economic significance of the associations of advisor engagement with Ebitda Multiple are 
substantial (29.8% and 31.5% larger Multiples than in the absence of the respective advisor 
during the earlier, and 29.7% and 35.1% during the later period). Further, during the 2000-2020 





side advisor; and 19.4% to 23.5% higher with a target advisors present. Finally, we find that 
bidder returns are 48.1% lower for buyers with acquirer advisor mandated in the time period 
2000-2020 in the three-day event window around the announcement of the transaction.  
While the positive correlation of target advisors with prices and premia and negative 
correlation with bidder returns is consistent with an interpretation of a positive advisor effect 
on value creation for the owners of the target (causality will be assessed below), the positive 
association of prices and premia and the negative association with bidder returns with acquirer 
advisors is difficult to square with value creation for the buy-side: ceteris paribus, higher prices 
and premia paid mean higher acquisition cost and therefore lower potential gains for the 
acquiring firm, indicated by significant lower bidder returns. Different interpretations will be 
discussed below. We next look at deal completion.  
Table 6 shows that the presence of both target and acquirer advisors is significantly 
correlated with larger deal completion likelihood in both sub periods. This holds in probit 
models as well as linear probability models. There is no significant difference between the 
coefficients of target and acquirer advisors in the probit model 1 and model 2. In the linear 
probability models 2 and 4, we also find no significant difference between the coefficients of 
target and acquirer advisor for both sub periods.   
< Table 4 > 
< Table 5 > 
< Table 6 > 
We observe a negative interaction of target and acquirer advisors. Interaction terms 
cannot easily be interpreted in nonlinear models, but the linear probability models confirm the 
sign of the observed effect (Hoetker, 2007). The result is consistent with the raw data showing 





to above 80 percent, with no additional benefit of joint presence of both advisors. Marginal 
effects analysis of the OLS model suggests larger completion likelihood of about 13% for target 
advisors during 1978-1999 and 9% during 2000-2020; and about 14 by acquirer advisors during 
1978-1999 and 10% during 2000-2020. Considering the strategic relevance of an acquisition or 
a divestiture for a company to successfully implement its long-term business objectives, these 
differences in completion rates are substantial. 
4. Investigating Causal Effects of Advisor Engagement: A Matching Approach 
4.1.  Matching Methodology 
Having shown the presence of substantial positive associations of advisor engagement with 
pricing indicators and deal completion, we next aim to establish whether these correlations can 
be interpreted in terms of causal effects. Several selection issues may be important in the current 
setting. Firms may be more likely to hire advisors, or advisors may more actively recruit 
engagements, on potentially larger and more likely deals. Advisors may also identify higher-
synergy deals, which should not be interpreted as price effects. Given our large data set, we can 
use matching methodology (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008) to overcome selection issues.2  The 
idea is to compare similar deals (in terms of observable target pre-deal properties) with and 
without an advisor present. To make inferences about the impact of advisor engagement on deal 
pricing and completion, we need to examine how the transaction outcome would differ had 
there been no advisor engagement. Because the counterfactual for a given transaction is not 
observed, we formalize the problem as the potential outcome approach or Roy-Rubin-model 
(Roy, 1951 and Rubin, 1974; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The fundamentals of the Roy-
Rubin model are individuals (here: transactions), treatments (here: with or without advisor 
engagement) and outcomes (here: Ebitda Multiple, Premia, CARs, and Deal Completion).  
                                                          
2 We also ran a Heckman selection model analysis. This analysis yields very similar estimates as the OLS model 





To estimate the causal treatment effects of advisors on relative deal pricing, premia, 
bidder returns and deal completion, we apply propensity score matching. Our matching model 
assigns the data to two groups: the “treated” group, which includes those transactions with an 
advisor, and the control group that includes transaction without an advisor. Treatment D is a 
binary variable that equals D=1 for treated observations and D=0 for control observations. In 
the first step, we estimate a logit model with D as latent variable, for the propensity of 
transactions to be conducted with support of an advisor. The vector of explanatory variables x 
includes the variables Sales Absolute (Log), Ebitda Margin, Industry of M&A Target, Country 
of M&A Target, Deal Attitude, Public Status of the Target, and Year of Transaction. The 
propensity score p(x) is the predicted probability that an acquirer advisor is engaged given the 
characteristics x:  
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝐷𝐷 = 1|𝑥𝑥) = 𝐸𝐸(𝐷𝐷|𝑥𝑥)    (1) 
In the second step, the model matches transactions from the treated and control sub-
samples on the basis of their propensity scores. Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), we 
chose the nearest neighbor matching estimator with replacement. Thus, our estimator selects 
those transactions without advisor as matching partners for a transaction with an advisor that 
are closest in terms of its propensity score. Transactions from the control group can be used 
multiple times as a match for a transaction in the treated sample, increasing matching quality 
and reducing model bias. In the third step, we calculate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
for the dependent variable of interest y (e.g. Ebitda Multiple (Log)), which is the difference 
between outcomes y of the matched transactions with advisor and those without advisor.   
                                        𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|x, D = 1) - 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦|x, D = 0)                          (2) 
We apply the matching model both to the entire sample, and to a restricted sample of those 
transactions that include an engagement of an advisor by the other side of the transaction (e.g., 





samples allow for an even more robust identification of causality as they focus on transactions 
that share some features that lead to the engagement of an advisor on at least one side of the 
deal. ATE is only defined if the variables in x do not perfectly predict treatment D. The region 
of common support is defined by the overlap between the treated and controlled observations 
in terms of their propensity score. As suggested by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), we 
visualized the support of the treatment and control groups to confirm the common support 
assumption.  
 
4.2.  Matching Analysis  
Table 7 shows the results of the matching estimation for both acquirer and target advisors, for 
the dependent variables Ebitda Multiple, Deal Completion, Premium (1 day, 1 week, 1 month), 
and the CARs (-1/+1, -2/+2, -3/+3, -4/+4). We find substantial and significant treatment effects 
for the whole sample for both advisor types for the dependent variables Ebitda Multiple, Deal 
Completion, Premia and CAR, confirming our main results reported in section 3. In particular, 
the negative effect of acquirer advisors on announcement returns shows significantly for all 
event windows now. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust if restricted to the 
sample of transactions with at least one advisor present. The effects are less sizable though for 
completions rates on the restricted sample, because the differences between groups become less 
substantial.  
< Table 7 > 
We assess the validity of the matching estimators using the visual inspection procedure 
as recommended by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). Figures  1 to 8 (acquirer advisor) as well 
as 9 to 16 (target advisor) in the Online Appendix visualize the support of the propensity scores 
for treated and control observations (left panel), and for the treated and the matched 





overlap of propensity scores for treated and controls in all cases, and that all scores between 
zero and one are covered, although the distribution of propensity scores is often quite different 
for treated and control observations. However, given our large data set and the matching with 
replacement, we see that we can achieve a close to perfect overlap of the distributions 
(distributions are visually indistinguishable in most figures). There are no gaps in the supports. 
We conclude that the matching procedure has been executed efficiently. Sensitivity analysis 
following Becker and Caliendo (2007) shows that results are not sensitive to violations of the 
confoundedness assumption (i.e., unobserved joint influences on the advisor selection and 
outcomes).   
Given the support for the validity of the propensity score matching approach presented 
here, we interpret the correlational results presented in Section 3 as causal effects of an advisor 
engagement on relative deal prices, premia, CAR, and deal-completion likelihood. For target 
advisors, this raises the question why target management does only engage advisors in about 
62% of the cases. For acquirer advisors, it implies an unexpected effect of advisor engagement 
on pricing, premia, and CAR. In Section 6  we will probe further the interpretation of the 
acquirer-advisor induced price effects. Before moving to interpretation, we will present another 
perspective on causality, using an alternative,  instrumental variable approach. 
 
5. Instrumental Variable Approach: Lehman Failure and Advisor Engagement 
5.1. Instrument  
In this section, we present a different approach to establishing a causal interpretation of the 
associations of advisor engagement with pricing and deal completion, using instrumental 
variables.3 We introduce the instrument Former Lehman Client Post Crisis. The basic rationale 
is that we predict an exogenously induced change of advisor engagement behavior by a specific 
                                                          
3 Our sample does not provide sufficient data on premia and CARs to implement these variables in our IV model, 





group, viz., former Lehman clients), triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15, 2008. The instrumental variable we construct represents the interaction between 
two variables: the variable Former Lehman Client, referring to clients who engaged the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers at least once in the time period of four years prior to its 
collapse; and the variable Post Crisis, which indicates the time period of four years after the 
collapse of Lehman brothers. In order to identify a causal interpretation of behavioral change 
of this group of clients, we implement a fixed effects model in which we test the effect of the 
interaction of Former Lehman Clients and the time period Post Crisis. Table 8 shows that the 
interaction of these two variables is significantly negative correlated with the engagement of 
acquirer advisor, indicating that this group of acquirers reduced its engagement of buy-side 
advisors after crisis. In the following, we will use this variable Former Lehman Clients Post 
Crisis to instrument the presence of acquirer advisor to test the robustness of the causal 
interpretation offered in section 4. 
< Table 8> 
We replace the potentially endogenous variable Acquirer Advisor with predicted values 
from a regression on our instrument. Our model is given by the two-stage structure: (1) estimate 
the first stage by predicting the potentially endogenous variables with only exogenous 
regressors, and (2) calculate the predicted values 𝑦𝑦�2  and substitute them in the structural 
equation model  
   𝑦𝑦2 = 𝑥𝑥1′𝛾𝛾1 +  𝑥𝑥2′ 𝛾𝛾2 +  𝜀𝜀                   (3) 
𝑦𝑦1 = 𝑦𝑦�2′𝛽𝛽1 +  𝑥𝑥1′𝛽𝛽2 + 𝑢𝑢                                (4) 
where 𝑦𝑦1 is the dependent variable Ebitda Multiple or Deal Completed,  𝑦𝑦2 is the potentially 
endogenous variable Acquirer Advisor, and 𝑥𝑥1 are the other control variables, Sales Absolute 





acquirer, time period (year), industry of the M&A target and country (headquarters) of the 
target. 
5.2. IV Results  
Instrumenting the presence of the acquirer advisor, we confirm the causal interpretation of our 
main results, a positive effect of acquirer advisor engagement on both deal completion 
likelihood and relative deal pricing (Table 9 and 10).  
< Table 9> 
< Table 10> 
 
6. Price Effects for Acquirer Advisors: Interpretation 
Having established a causal link between advisor engagement on both sides of the deal and 
higher prices, we next focus on the mechanism and interpretation of the effect. We argue that 
the institutional setting promotes focus on deal completion and higher prices, for both acquirer 
and target executives and advisors. Only for targets are these goals aligned with shareholder 
interests. The price-driving effect observed for acquirer advisors is therefore consistent with an 
interpretation of overpayment and negative advisor effects for acquirer shareholders. We have 
seen that there is strong evidence that premia increase, and announcement returns are decrease 
if acquirer advisors are engaged. Our interpretation is also consistent with the broader literature 
showing that even with overall efficient deals, the buy-side owners do not typically benefit from 
acquisitions, while the target owners benefit strongly (Moeller et al., 2004; Andrade et al., 
2001). However, an alternative explanation is possible. Acquirer advisors may help to complete 
a deal where unadvised buyers may not succeed, because they are too unwilling to increase 
prices, although the target is in fact more valuable. That is, advisors may identify important 
synergies that are not identified by unadvised buyers. We will probe this alternative 





6.1.  Listed versus Non-listed Targets  
Several studies have argued that differences in information asymmetries when acquiring a 
private versus a publicly listed target have strong ramifications for the M&A process and the 
role of financial advisors (Agrawal et al., 2018; Custódio and Metzger, 2013; Golubov et al. 
2012). Due to stricter accounting and reporting standards for listed firms, publicly listed M&A 
targets provide qualitatively and quantitatively better information. Deals with public targets are 
therefore easier to assess by both acquirers and the market, and are also more closely followed 
by the market. Consequently, there will be smaller discounts for public compared to private 
targets (Agrawal et al., 2018), and the increased market scrutiny will lead reputation-oriented 
acquirer financial advisor to cut better deals for their clients (Golubov et al., 2012).     
 Table 11 gives results for a specification that restricts the sample to those deals with a 
TA present. We focus on the effect of acquirer advisors and target public-listing status on prices, 
and on their interaction. We replicate the positive effect of acquirer advisors on Multiples, and 
also find a positive effect of target public-listing as suggested in the literature (Agrawal et al., 
2018). Consistent with the reputation argument of Golubov et al. (2012), the interaction 
between advisor engagement and public status is significantly and substantially negative. The 
price-driving effect of acquirer advisors is especially severe in private deals where reputational 
concerns are reduced.   
< Table 11 > 
6.2.  Bargaining Power  
Previous studies have shown that it is easier for the buy-side to capture acquisition gains if the 
target is unadvised (Agrawal et al., 2018; Golubov et al., 2012). In Table 14 we show 
specifications with restricted samples of deals with either the target advisor present (model 1) 





be able to play out its beneficial influence most strongly, realizing cheaper deals irrespective of 
the identified synergies. Table 12 shows that the effect of the acquirer advisor is similar and 
significantly positive for both the advised and unadvised targets. There is no indication that 
acquirer advisors make use of their bargaining power.  
< Table 12 > 
 
7. Discussion of Acquirer Advisor Impact in Monetary Terms 
We have shown a positive causal effect of advisor engagement on Ebitda Multiples in M&A. 
For acquirer advisors we have argued for an interpretation in terms of overpayment on the basis 
of our data, and consistent with the governance-failure framework supported by the literature. 
If buy-side advisors destroy value for acquirer owners, it is of interest to establish an intuitive 
interpretation of the observed price effect. We suggest a financial model that quantifies 
marginal effects in monetary terms. We analyze the residual transaction value in US Dollars 
that is caused by the presence of the acquirer advisor versus a zero effect. That is, we use a 
neutral benchmark, rather than demanding that advisors realize cheaper deals. To quantify this 
value, we discount the reported average Ebitda Multiple by the marginal effects derived from 
the regression analysis. We use the results of Table 12 for the calculations. This table shows the 
acquirer advisor engagement effect on Ebitda Multiples in case target advisors are present in 
order to implement a rather prudent estimate. We calculate the effect using the estimate of 
31.60% for all transactions in which the acquirer advisor completed a transaction, in which a 
target advisor was present and 37.8% in the absence of the target advisor. We discount the 
reported average Ebitda Multiple from 20.04 (AA and TA present) and 20.18 (only AA present) 
to 15.23 and 14.64 in order to determine the average Ebitda Multiple if the acquirer advisor 
effect were zero over these two constellations. We do this for all transactions with acquirer 





 In the next step, we apply the adjusted Ebitda Multiple on the average Deal Size and 
Number of Transactions that reported an acquirer advisor, resulting in a lower total transaction 
value. The difference between the actual transaction value and the transaction value based on 
the adjusted average Ebitda Multiple indicates the deal value that is caused by the presence of 
the acquirer advisor. Since the impact (i.e., the coefficients in the regression model) of the 
acquirer advisor is positive, the monetary impact of the acquirer advisor on the transaction value 
is positive, which we interpret as overpayment following the literature. Applying our financial 
model as described to all transactions in which acquirer advisors had been engaged, we estimate 
the total US Dollar impact of the acquirer advisor between 4.7tn US Dollars between 1978 and 
2020 (excluding acquirer advisor fees; in 2019 dollars). Details are in Appendix B.  
8. Conclusion 
This paper set out to clarify the role of financial advisors in M&A. Several papers have studied 
the role of advisors in specific segments of the market (non-listed firms, role of top-tier 
advisors), in specific contexts (industry experience, cross-border transactions). We took a 
broader look at the role of advisors on both the buy-side and the sell-side of the market, looking 
for general principles in how governance issues may translate in deal pricing and value creation. 
Investigating the association of advisor engagement with relative deal pricing, premia, bidder 
returns, and deal completion, we observe that both sell-side advisors and buy-side advisors 
positively correlate with deal prices, premia, and completion. At the same time, we find that 
both, the buy-side and sell-side advisor are significantly negative associated with bidder returns. 
Matching estimators, as well as instrumental variable analysis using the impact of the Lehman 
failure on Lehman clients, support a causal interpretation in terms of advisor effects. Our results 
support a causal effect, over and beyond possible selection effects due to endogenous advisor 
engagement and identification of potential deals by advisors.  While the direction of the effects 





targets (Agrawal et al., 2018; Golubov et al., 2012), we find that buy-side advisors also have a 
price- and premia increasing effect and a decreasing impact on bidder returns - which might be 
an additional explanation for value destruction in mergers. Our analysis on deal completion 
similarly supports a causal effect, with both sell-side and buy-side advisors improving deal 
completion likelihood. Interpretations in terms of either improving deals (identifying important 
synergies and thus acquirer’s willingness to pay) and in terms of value destruction (flawed 
incentive structure for executives and advisors) are possible. In several analyses zooming in 
into this question, the evidence points in the direction of value destruction. We find strong 
evidence for increased premia paid by buyers for deals with an advisor engaged on their side, 
and we find significantly negative evidence for announcement returns on deals cut by acquirer 
advisors. We find that acquirer advisors do not play out their bargaining power, and they 
increase prices most if stakes for their reputation are low. The findings are consistent with the 
broader literature on mergers and acquisitions showing that even for ex-post efficient deals, 
acquirer shareholders do not typically benefit acquisitions. In the following we will discuss 
interpretations of our findings considering incentive structures, advisor roles and prioritization 
of deal objectives. 
Our results support a critical perspective on incentive structures, advisor roles and 
prioritization of deal objectives.  Grinstein and Hribar (2003) show that top executives are 
incentivized by deal completion and high prices – even in the process of buying assets. They 
find that approximately 39% of acquiring firms reward their CEOs for successful completion 
of a merger or acquisition deal (M&A bonus). Further, the authors suggest that CEOs receive 
higher M&A bonuses when deals are larger, observing that CEOs effort and skill do not explain 





to be linked to deal performance.4 Grinstein and Hribar (2003) conclude that this misalignment 
of incentives, allowing CEOs to extract rents from shareholders through additional bonuses, 
may lead to self-serving behavior at the costs of shareholders equity. Consistent with this 
perspective, McLaughlin (1990) finds that both target advisors and acquirer advisors are 
contractually incentivized with a high variable payment linked to successful deal completion 
and size of the deal: the higher the negotiated deal price, the higher the payoff for the advisor. 
Work by Coffman and Real (2018) on justifiability of difficult managerial decisions suggests 
that delegation to advisors plays an important role for executives. This is likely also the case in 
implementing and justifying M&A deals in the current governance structure. Recent work by 
Golubov and Xiong (2020) shows that private acquirers with less severe governance problems 
pay indeed lower prices for targets. Assuming an overpayment interpretation, we estimate the 
monetary effect of acquirer advisor engagement in the range of approximately 355m US Dollar 
per transaction.  
 Considering target shareholders’ interest of maximizing deal value by achieving high 
M&A selling prices, contractual incentives of both top executives and sell-side advisors are 
closely aligned. However, incentive schemes for top executives and respective acquirer 
advisors on the buy-side bear a risk of misalignment with shareholders’ interests. Roll (1986), 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) or Malmendier and Tate (2005) are prominent sources, 
suggesting that buyers often overpay due to CEO hubris or overconfidence, destroying value of 
shareholders' equity. Our findings contribute an additional explanation to overpayments in 
M&A. Both top buy-side executives and acquirer advisors maximize their individual payoffs, 
based on incentives provided by M&A bonus contracts and advisor contracts, by prioritizing 
                                                          
4 Grinstein and Hribar (2003) use deal premium as a measure of deal performance, defined as the target price in 
the deal, divided by the market value of the target four weeks before the deal. They obtain information on the 






deal completion and benefitting from high prices. More junior executives obtain careers 
benefits from playing along, as well (Botelho et al., 2018).  
 A second interesting perspective of our results regards the potential role for 
overconfidence on the sell-side of M&A transactions. Only a share of 62% of the transactions 
involve a target advisor. This seems at odds with the unambiguous and simultaneously positive 
effects of target advisors on pricing and deal completion likelihood, and given that a similar 
share of acquirers engages a buy-side advisor (for whom engagement is costly both in terms of 
fees, and prices, as we have shown). Custódio and Metzger (2013) also show that CEOs with 
target-industry experience are less likely to engage an advisor in diversifying acquisitions. One 
interpretation for these results is provided in the context of the work by Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) and Roll (1986) in terms of evidence for overconfidence and hubris. While these authors 
like Roll (1986) or Malmendier and Tate (2005) focus on the buy-side, the current evidence 
suggests that these effects may affect behavior on the sell-side.  
 Assuming the validity of our interpretations, stricter supervisory control in M&A 
projects may thus be warranted to improve decisions given the aforementioned misaligned 
incentives. However, while Goranova et al. (2017) show that increased monitoring by 
supervisory boards helps containing M&A losses, they also observe that tighter control reduces 
M&A gains. We conclude that the decision to engage an advisor, and the subsequent effects of 
the advisor on transaction outcomes, are likely influenced by both aspects of a potentially 
misaligned incentive structure and psychological aspects like executives’ overconfidence. 
Biases may also be present at the level of supervisory boards. Further research is needed though, 
to identify the exact decision processes to unambiguously separate incentive effects from 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics – Completed Transactions 
 
Time Period 1978 to 1999 2000 to 2020 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Financials           
Ebitda Multiple  9293 17.859 49.78 .001 977.275 19654 20.84 57.147 .001 985.898 
Ebitda Multiple(log) 9293 2.207 1.05 -6.908 6.885 19654 2.244 1.17 -6.908 6.894 
Sales Absolute (m) 9197 564.444 1708.79 1.483 14426.23 19630 753.643 2016.124 1.483 14426.23 
Sales Absolute(log) 9197 4.461 1.934 .394 9.577 19630 4.866 1.931 .394 9.577 
Ebitda Absolute (m) 9182 75.165 243.004 -.146 2184.6 19395 111.759 307.065 -.146 2184.6 
Ebitda Absolute(log) 9084 2.355 2.058 -5.521 7.689 19162 2.783 2.11 -6.215 7.689 
Ebitda Margin 9293 .171 .148 .001 1 19654 .189 .177 .001 1 
Deal Size (m) 9293 488.204 1544.519 .505 15025.07 19654 783.756 2136.208 .505 15025.07 
Deal Size(log) 9293 4.311 1.986 -.683 9.617 19654 4.625 2.177 -.683 9.617 
Target Advisor 9293 .642 .479 0 1 19654 .652 .476 0 1 
Acquirer Advisor 9293 .55 .498 0 1 19654 .592 .491 0 1 
Premium1Day 4585 32.595 36.352 -70.83 202.2 11699 25.324 38.037 -70.83 202.2 
Premium1Week 4506 37.968 38.288 -71.43 212 11692 27.879 39.219 -71.43 212 
Premium1Month 4505 43.058 41.017 -72.03 223.56 11680 31.017 41.806 -72.03 223.56 
CAR (-1/+1) 3888 .001 .041 -.132 .149 3435 .002 .039 -.132 .149 
CAR (-2/+2) 3888 .004 .081 -.233 .28 3435 .002 .078 -.233 .28 
CAR (-3/+3) 3888 .003 .089 -.259 .298 3435 .001 .087 -.259 .298 
CAR (-4/+4) 3888 .003 .095 -.269 .311 3435 .001 .092 -.269 .311 
           
Public Status of the Target           
Public 9293 .685 .464 0 1 19654 .696 .46 0 1 
Subsidiary 9293 .113 .317 0 1 19654 .126 .332 0 1 
Private 9293 .195 .396 0 1 19654 .173 .379 0 1 
Other Status 9293 .004 .06 0 1 19654 .001 .032 0 1 
 
Deal Attitude 
          
Friendly 9293 .934 .248 0 1 19654 .928 .258 0 1 
Neutral 9293 .007 .086 0 1 19654 .03 .17 0 1 
Hostile 9293 .027 .162 0 1 19654 .004 .062 0 1 
Other Attitude 9293 .031 .174 0 1 19654 .038 .191 0 1 
 
Notes: We use Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database on mergers and acquisitions transactions to gather all reported M&A transactions during 1978 and 2020. Data 
is sourced through direct deal submissions from global banking and legal contributors coupled with extensive research performed by a global research team, collecting 
data from regulatory filings, corporate statements, media, and pricing wires. According to Thomson Reuters, more than 2,500 control validations occur at the point of data 
entry. We use CRSP database to model Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). We estimate the model over a 255-day window ending 46 days prior to the announcement 
date, using CRSP Value Weighted Index as our market proxy. We report CAR over a 3-, 5-,7- and 9-day window.  To account for outliers, we winsorize the variables 
Premium (1 day, 1 week, 1 month) and CAR (-1/+1, -2/+2, -3/+3, -4/+4). Reported values are after winsorizing. Further, we focus on transactions with a deal size above 





Table 2. Summary Statistics – Incompleted Transactions 
 
Time Period 1978 to 1999 2000 to 2020 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Financials           
Ebitda Multiple  2462 15.296 41.692 .002 754.516 4570 19.312 55.655 .004 984.56 
Ebitda Multiple(log) 2462 2.033 1.085 -6.215 6.626 4570 2.128 1.188 -5.521 6.892 
Sales Absolute (m) 2424 866.64 2212.229 1.483 14426.23 4564 892.483 2290.827 1.483 14426.23 
Sales Absolute(log) 2424 4.992 1.96 .394 9.577 4564 5 1.985 .394 9.577 
Ebitda Absolute (m) 2420 109.761 296.855 -.146 2184.6 4534 138.723 361.291 -.146 2184.6 
Ebitda Absolute(log) 2397 2.805 2.063 -4.075 7.689 4484 2.915 2.186 -6.215 7.689 
Ebitda Margin 2462 .161 .149 .001 .994 4570 .183 .166 .001 .989 
Deal Size (m) 2462 671.709 1964.001 .505 15025.07 4570 935.128 2570.408 .505 15025.07 
Deal Size(log) 2462 4.504 2.061 -.683 9.617 4570 4.44 2.367 -.683 9.617 
Target Advisor 2462 .503 .5 0 1 4570 .494 .5 0 1 
Acquirer Advisor 2462 .38 .486 0 1 4570 .455 .498 0 1 
Premium1Day 1555 31.724 38.168 -70.83 202.2 3415 23.92 42.183 -70.83 202.2 
Premium1Week 1520 35.768 40.223 -71.43 212 3421 26.37 44.128 -71.43 212 
Premium1Month 1514 39.42 42.605 -72.03 223.56 3414 29.191 47.048 -72.03 223.56 
CAR (-1/+1) 648 -.001 .044 -.132 .149 460 -.005 .039 -.132 .149 
CAR (-2/+2) 648 -.004 .079 -.233 .28 460 -.011 .082 -.233 .28 
CAR (-3/+3) 648 -.009 .084 -.259 .298 460 -.013 .092 -.259 .298 
CAR (-4/+4) 648 -.01 .09 -.269 .311 460 -.017 .101 -.269 .311 
 
Public Status of the Target 
          
Public 2462 .894 .308 0 1 4570 .884 .32 0 1 
Subsidiary 2462 .042 .201 0 1 4570 .048 .215 0 1 
Private 2462 .061 .24 0 1 4570 .066 .248 0 1 
Other Status 2462 .002 .04 0 1 4570 0 .021 0 1 
 
Deal Attitude 
          
Friendly 2462 .686 .464 0 1 4570 .794 .404 0 1 
Neutral 2462 .006 .08 0 1 4570 .022 .147 0 1 
Hostile 2462 .18 .385 0 1 4570 .037 .188 0 1 
Other Attitude 2462 .127 .333 0 1 4570 .147 .354 0 1 
 
Notes: We use Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database on mergers and acquisitions transactions to gather all reported M&A transactions during 1978 and 2020. Data 
is sourced through direct deal submissions from global banking and legal contributors coupled with extensive research performed by a global research team, collecting 
data from regulatory filings, corporate statements, media, and pricing wires. According to Thomson Reuters, more than 2,500 control validations occur at the point of data 
entry. We use CRSP database to model Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). We estimate the model over a 255-day window ending 46 days prior to the announcement 
date, using CRSP Value Weighted Index as our market proxy. We report CAR over a 3-, 5-,7- and 9-day window.  To account for outliers, we winsorize the variables 
Premium (1 day, 1 week, 1 month) and CAR (-1/+1, -2/+2, -3/+3, -4/+4). Reported values are after winsorizing. Further, we focus on transactions with a deal size above 





Table 3. Summary Statistics – Key variables by Advisor Engagement Constellation 
 
    All TA+ TA+ TA- TA- 
     AA+ AA- AA+ AA- 
Transactions  35,979 15,923 6,347  3,835 9,874 
Share of transactions (relative)  44.26% 17.64% 10.66% 27.44% 
Completed Deals  28,947 13587 5188 3157 7015 
Share of Completed Deals 
(relative) 
80.46%   85.33%    81.74%
  
 82.32% 71.05% 
Deal Size (mean) in $m 718.978 1185.674 496.22 198.85 89.65 
Ebitda Multiple (mean) 19.497 20.038 19.594 20.176 19.666 
Premium1Day 27.135 29.392 30.218 19.744 18.908 
Premium1Week 30.352 32.798 33.58 23.226 21.503 
Premium1Month 33.893 36.457 37.435 26.957 24.974 
CAR (-1/+1) 0.0010 -.001 .002 .004 .007 
CAR (-2/+2) 0.0014 -.007 .007 .018 .024 
CAR (-3/+3) 0.0004 -.008 .008 .018 .023 
CAR (-4/+4) 0.0003 -.008 .007 .024 .022 
Sales absolute (mean) in $m 730.399 1013.217 570.944 439.344 275.815 
Ebitda Margin 0.182 0.192 0.178 0.182 0.172 
Ebitda Absolute (mean) in $m 105.607 150.776 79.029 59.738 34.241 
Notes: TA+ (and TA-) indicates the engagement (not engagement) of target advisor in the transaction. AA+ (AA-
) indicates the engagement (not engagement) of acquirer advisor in the transaction. Based on this definition, the 
four advisor engagement constellation TA+AA+ (advisors on sell- side and buy-side), TA+AA- (advisor only on 







Table 4. OLS Regressions: Advisor engagement and Pricing Premia and Cumulative Abnormal Returns – 1978 to 1999 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















           
Target Advisor 0.298*** 1.706 1.191 1.796 -0.162 -0.159 -0.267** -0.353*** 
   (0.036) (3.013) (3.194) (3.426) (0.112) (0.124) (0.112) (0.125) 
           
Acquirer Advisor 0.315*** -2.620 -1.365 0.810 0.168 -0.022 0.039 -0.317* 
   (0.046) (3.546) (3.749) (4.225) (0.137) (0.140) (0.147) (0.177) 
         
TA x AA -0.049 2.307 2.093 0.643 -0.186 0.061 0.094 0.330* 
   (0.050) (3.907) (4.110) (4.609) (0.160) (0.171) (0.189) (0.195) 
           
Sales Absolute(log) -0.180*** -0.585 -0.597 -0.850* 0.011 0.002 0.006 0.002 
   (0.010) (0.431) (0.435) (0.455) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) 
 
EBITDA Margin -2.320*** -12.805*** -16.339*** -22.520*** 0.151 0.024 -0.082 -0.048 
   (0.117) (4.919) (5.379) (5.715) (0.270) (0.242) (0.240) (0.277) 
         
Deal Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Year, Industry and Country 
Fixed Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 3.065*** 36.821*** 42.535*** 48.789*** -3.181*** -3.185*** -3.315*** -3.992*** 
   (0.047) (3.378) (3.467) (3.665) (0.122) (0.119) (0.130) (0.133) 
         
Obs. 9176 4534 4456 4458 1810 1801 1824 1842 
         
R-squared  0.254 0.145 0.142 0.148 0.247 0.247 0.243 0.225 
     
Notes: Entries show coefficients of OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variables are Ebitda Multiple(log), Premium (1 day, 1 week, 
1 month) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-1/+1, -2/+2, -3/+3, -4/+4), indicating the relative deal price of the transaction, premia paid by the acquirer and 
cumulative abnormal returns earned by the bidder in the respective event window. We use the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and Ebitda Margin; also including 
further deal level controls Deal Attitude (friendly, neutral, hostile), Target Public Status (public, private) as well as Form of the Transaction (acquisition, merger, or 
other form of transaction). We use fixed effects variables for time period (year), industry of the M&A target and country (headquarters) of the target. We analyze the 
effect of buy-side and sell-side advisor engagement on pricing, premia, and cumulative abnormal returns in the time period 1978 to 1999.  ***, **, and * denote 







Table 5. OLS Regressions: Advisor engagement and Pricing Premia and Cumulative Abnormal Returns – 2000 to 2020 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
















           
Target Advisor 0.297*** 0.194*** 0.235*** 0.221*** -0.293** -0.219* -0.219* -0.262** 
   (0.030) (0.063) (0.057) (0.058) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.113) 
           
Acquirer Advisor 0.351*** 0.148** 0.218*** 0.174*** -0.245 0.044 0.044 -0.481*** 
   (0.032) (0.064) (0.060) (0.060) (0.150) (0.141) (0.141) (0.153) 
         
TA x AA 0.031 -0.079 -0.174*** -0.109 0.414** 0.115 0.115 0.414** 
   (0.038) (0.075) (0.067) (0.067) (0.169) (0.170) (0.170) (0.172) 
           
Sales Absolute(log) -0.185*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.048*** 0.034 0.053* 0.053* 0.099*** 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
EBITDA Margin -2.103*** -0.781*** -0.787*** -0.646*** 0.407* 0.074 0.074 0.015 
   (0.069) (0.094) (0.090) (0.085) (0.242) (0.245) (0.245) (0.249) 
         
Deal Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Year, Industry and Country 
Fixed Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant 3.127*** 3.279*** 3.360*** 3.384*** -3.428*** -3.574*** -3.574*** -3.708*** 
   (0.034) (0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.142) (0.151) (0.151) (0.144) 
         
Obs. 19616 9717 9907 9984 1698 1655 1655 1674 
         
R-squared  0.233 0.151 0.160 0.150 0.263 0.264 0.264 0.294 
     
Notes: Entries show coefficients of OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variables are Ebitda Multiple(log), Premium (1 day, 1 week, 
1 month) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (-1/+1, -2/+2, -3/+3, -4/+4), indicating the relative deal price of the transaction, premia paid by the acquirer and 
cumulative abnormal returns earned by the bidder in the respective event window. We use the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and Ebitda Margin; also including 
further deal level controls Deal Attitude (friendly, neutral, hostile), Target Public Status (public, private) as well as Form of the Transaction (acquisition, merger, or 
other form of transaction). We use fixed effects variables for time period (year), industry of the M&A target and country (headquarters) of the target. We analyze the 
effect of buy-side and sell-side advisor engagement on pricing, premia, and cumulative abnormal returns in the time period 2000 to 2020.  ***, **, and * denote 









Table 6. Probit and OLS: Advisor engagement effect on Deal Completion – 1978 to 1999 and 
2000-2020 
 
  1978-1999  1978-1999 2000-2020 2000-2020 
       Completed 
Probit (1) 
   Completed 
OLS (2) 
   Completed 
Probit (3) 
   Completed 
OLS (4) 
       
Target Advisor 0.725*** 0.165*** 0.495*** 0.120*** 
   (0.051) (0.010) (0.035) (0.007) 
       
Acquirer Advisor 0.788*** 0.180*** 0.514*** 0.129*** 
   (0.067) (0.013) (0.039) (0.008) 
     
TA x AA -0.261*** -0.059*** -0.222*** -0.053*** 
   (0.081) (0.016) (0.048) (0.010) 
       
Sales Absolute(log) -0.071*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.004*** 
   (0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) 
EBITDA Margin 0.037 0.007 0.091 0.031** 
   (0.125) (0.026) (0.072) (0.015) 
     
Deal Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year, Industry and 
Country Fixed Effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.917 0.694*** 1.116** 0.703*** 
   (1.001) (0.012) (0.452) (0.008) 
     
Obs. 11515 11592 24129 24179 
     
R-squared  0.283 0.305 0.212 0.256 
     
Notes: We analyze the effect of buy-side and sell-side advisor engagement on deal completion likelihood between two time periods 1978 to 1999 and 2000 to 2020. 1 and 
3: Entries show coefficient of Probit regressions. 2 and 4: Entries show coefficients of OLS regressions. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is 
Completed, indicating the status of the transaction. We use the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and Ebitda Margin; also including further deal level controls Deal Attitude 
(friendly, neutral, hostile), Target Public Status (public, private) as well as Form of the Transaction (acquisition, merger, or other form of transaction). We use fixed 






Table 7. Propensity score matching: Average Treatment Effects of Advisor Engagements on 
Relative Deal Pricing, Deal Completion, and Returns 
 
 (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) 

























































































































Notes: The table shows propensity score matching models (nearest neighbor estimator with replacement) results. 
1a and 2a include the full sample of transactions. Models 1b (resp. 2b) use the samples restricted to transactions 
in which the Target Advisor (resp. Acquirer Advisor) is present. ATE is defined as the average treatment effect 
of Ebitda Multiple (log), Completed, Premium (1 day, 1 week, 1 month), and Cumulative Abnormal Return (event 
window -1/+1, -2/+2, -3/+3, -4/+4), indicating the difference between outcomes of transactions with and without 
advisor present. Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis. We use the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and 
Ebitda Margin; also including further deal level controls such as Deal Attitude (friendly, neutral, hostile), Target 
Public Status (public, private). We use fixed effects variables for time period (year), industry of the M&A target 
and country (headquarters) of the target. We analyze the causal effect of buy-side and sell-side advisor 
engagement on relative deal pricing and deal completion likelihood. Further, we analyze advisor engagement 












Table 8. Fixed Effects Model – Behavioral change of former Lehman clients (prior and after 
Lehman crisis, Sep 15, 2008) 
 
     
    Acquirer Advisor 
Former Lehman Clients Post Crisis -0.101*** 
   (0.036) 
 
Sales Absolute (Log) 0.097*** 
   (0.003) 
 
EBITDA Margin 0.214*** 





Further Deal Level Controls Yes 
 
Time, Industry and Country Fixed Effects Yes 
 
Obs. 5403 
R-squared  0.1640 
  
Notes: Entry shows coefficients of OLS regression. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent 
variable is the Acquirer Advisor, indicating the engagement of buy-side advisor on the transaction. We use 
the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and Ebitda Margin; also including further deal level controls such as 
Deal Attitude (friendly, neutral, hostile), Target Public Status (public, private) as well as Form of the 
Transaction (acquisition, merger, or other form of transaction). We use fixed effects variables for acquirer, 
time period (month), industry of the M&A target and country (headquarters) of the target. We analyze 
behavioral change of former Lehman clients after the crisis starting from Sep 15, 2008. The variable Former 
Lehman Clients Post Crisis is our instrumental variable in the subsequent instrumental variables’ analyses.  















Table 9. Instrumental Variables 2SLS Model: Acquirer Advisor effect on deal completion  
  
      (1)    (2) 




   Completed 
2SLS 
Acquirer Advisor 0.301***  0.760** 
   (0.050)  (0.384) 
 
Sales Absolute (Log) -0.039*** 0.097*** -0.075** 
   (0.013) (0.003) 
 
(0.037) 
EBITDA Margin -0.009 0.214*** -0.134 
   (0.124) (0.035) 
 
(0.090) 
Former Lehman Clients Post Crisis  -0.101*** 
(0.04) 
 
    
Constant 2.972*** 0.167 0.935*** 
   (0.687) (0.146) 
 
(0.180) 
Deal Level Controls Yes Yes Yes 
 
Time, Industry, Acquirer, and 
Country Fixed Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 5403 5403 5403 
    
Notes: Entry 1 shows coefficients of probit regression; entry 2 shows coefficient of 2SLS regression. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the Completed, indicating the status of transaction. We 
use the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and Ebitda Margin; also including further deal level controls Deal 
Attitude (friendly, neutral, hostile), Target Public Status (public, private) as well as Form of the Transaction 
(acquisition, merger, or other form of transaction. We use fixed effects variables for acquirer, time period 
(month), industry of the M&A target and country (headquarters) of the target. We instrument the presence of 
the acquirer advisor with the instrument Former Lehman Clients Post Crisis as described in table 9. ***, **, 















Table 10. Instrumental Variables 2SLS: Acquirer Advisor engagement effect on relative 
deal pricing 
  
      (1)      (2) 






  Ebitda Multiple 
(log) 
2SLS 
Acquirer Advisor 0.525***  2.166** 
   (0.034)  (1.074) 
 
Sales Absolute (Log) -0.175*** 0.097*** -0.334*** 
   (0.009) (0.003) (0.104) 
    
EBITDA Margin -1.649*** 0.214*** -1.999*** 
   (0.088) (0.035) 
 
(0.252) 
    




    
Constant 5.781*** 0.1675 5.374*** 
 (0.359) (0.146) 
 
(0.504) 
Further Deal Level Controls Yes Yes Yes 
    
Time, Industry, Acquirer, and 
Country Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
      
 Obs. 5,403 5,403 5,403 
    
Notes: Entry 1 shows coefficient of OLS regressions; entry 2 shows coefficient of 2SLS regression. Standard 
errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is the Ebitda Multiple(log) of the transaction of the acquisition. 
We use the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and Ebitda Margin; also including further deal level controls Deal 
Attitude (friendly, neutral, hostile), Target Public Status (public, private) as well as Form of the Transaction 
(acquisition, merger, or other form of transaction). We use fixed effects variables for acquirer, time period 
(month), industry of the M&A target and country (headquarters) of the target. We instrument the presence of the 
acquirer advisor with the instrument Former Lehman Clients Post Crisis as described in table 9.  ***, **, and * 





Table 11. Deal Pricing: Differences in degree of information asymmetries: listed vs. non-
listed targets; TA present 
 
    Ebitda Multiple (Log) 
(1) 
Ebitda Multiple (Log) 
(2) 
Model OLS OLS 















Sales Absolute (Log)  -0.161*** 
(0.004) 
     
EBITDA Margin  -1.438*** 
(0.043) 






Deal Level Controls No Yes 




# Obs. 18775 9,676 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.007 0.124 
Notes: Entry 1 shows coefficient of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the Ebitda Multiple(log) of the 
transaction of the acquisition. We use the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and Ebitda Margin; also including 
further deal level controls Deal Attitude (friendly, neutral, hostile), Target Public Status (public, private) as well 
as Form of the Transaction (acquisition, merger, or other form of transaction). We use fixed effects variables for 
acquirer, time period (month), industry of the M&A target and country (headquarters) of the target. We estimate 
the interaction effect of the public target status on relative deal pricing in transactions with an Acquirer Advisor 



















Table 12. Deal Pricing: Effects of AA with TA present vs. absent 
    Ebitda Multiple (Log) 
(1) 
Ebitda Multiple (Log) 
(2) 
 TA present TA absent 




     




     










Deal Level Controls Yes Yes 
Year, Industry and Country Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
# Obs. 18697 10070 
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.259 0.251 
 
Notes: Entry 1 shows coefficient of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the Ebitda Multiple(log) of the 
transaction of the acquisition. We use the covariates Sales Absolute (Log) and Ebitda Margin; also including 
further deal level controls Deal Attitude (friendly, neutral, hostile), Target Public Status (public, private) as well 
as Form of the Transaction (acquisition, merger, or other form of transaction). We use fixed effects variables 
for acquirer, time period (month), industry of the M&A target and country (headquarters) of the target. Given 
that advisors on both sides of the deal will be similarly affected by incentives and anticipation of deal worth, we 
further reduce selection problems by focusing on those transactions with at least a target advisor present.  ***, 


























Appendix A: Definition of Terms 
 








Financial advisor(s) to the acquiror's company, its management or board of directors 
on the transaction. 
Deal Size Value of Transaction ($ ): Total value of consideration paid by the acquiror, 
excluding fees and expenses. The dollar value includes the amount paid for all 
common stock, common stock equivalents, preferred stock, debt, options, assets, 
warrants, and stake purchases made within six months of the announcement date of 
the transaction. Liabilities assumed are included in the value if they are publicly 
disclosed. Preferred stock is only included if it is being acquired as part of a 100% 
acquisition. If a portion of the consideration paid by the acquiror is common stock, 
the stock is valued using the closing price on the last full trading day prior to the 
announcement of the terms of the stock swap. If the exchange ratio of shares offered 
changes, the stock is valued based on its closing price on the last full trading date 
prior to the date of the exchange ratio change. For public target 100% acquisitions, 
the number of shares at date of announcement is used. 
Ebitda Multiple The EBITDA multiple is a financial ratio that compares a company’s Enterprise 
Value to its annual EBITDA.  This multiple is used to determine the value of a 
company and compare it to the value of other, similar businesses. A company’s 
EBITDA multiple provides a normalized ratio for differences in capital structure, 
taxation, fixed assets, and for comparing disparities of operations in various 
companies. The ratio takes a company’s enterprise value (which represents market 
capitalization plus net debt) and compares it to the Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation, and Amortization (EBITDA) for a given period. 
Premium 1 day  Premium 1 Day Prior to Announcement Date: Premium of offer price to target 
closing stock price 1 day prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a 
percentage 
Premium 1 Week Premium 1 Week Prior to Announcement Date: Premium of offer price to target 
closing stock price 1 week prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a 
percentage 
Premium 1 Month Premium 4 Weeks Prior to Announcement Date: Premium of offer price to target 




Cumulative Abnormal Returns -1/+1 indicates the sum of the differences between 
the expected return (S&P500 Index) on the acquirer’s stock (US publicly listed firms) 
and the actual return during the event windows of 1 day prior and 1 day after 
announcement of the acquisition. 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (-2/+2) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns -2/+2 indicates the sum of the differences between 
the expected return (S&P500 Index) on the acquirer’s stock (US publicly listed firms) 
and the actual return during the event windows of 2 days prior and 2 days after 
announcement of the acquisition. 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (-3/+3) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns -3/+3 indicates the sum of the differences between 
the expected return (S&P500 Index) on the acquirer’s stock (US publicly listed firms) 
and the actual return during the event windows of 3 days prior and 3 days after 
announcement of the acquisition. 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (-4/+4) 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns -4/+4 indicates the sum of the differences between 
the expected return (S&P500 Index) on the acquirer’s stock (US publicly listed firms) 
and the actual return during the event windows of 4 days prior and 4 days after 





Sales Absolute Net Sales represents sales receipts for products and services, net of cash discounts, 
trade discounts, excise tax, and sales returns and allowances. Revenues are 
recognized according to applicable accounting principles. 
Ebitda Absolute Earnings before the deduction of interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. It is 
a non-GAAP calculation based on data from a company's income statement used to 
measure a company's operating profitability. Because EBITDA adds back to net 
income the non-cash accounting charges of depreciation and amortization and 
disregards interest paid on debt financing and income taxes on earnings, it is useful 
for measuring a company's operating cash flow and for comparing the profitability 
of companies with different capital structures and in different tax brackets. However, 
EBITDA does not measure, and should not be confused with, the actual cash flow of 
a company which accounts for interest paid on debt financing, income taxes and other 
cash charges. 
Ebitda Margin Ebitda Absolute a as a percentage of Sales Absolute. 
Target Industry Industry in which the M&A target operates 
Target Country Country of the selling company’s headquarters 
Acquirer Industry Industry in which the buying company operates 
Acquirer Country Country of the buying company’s headquarters 
Deal Status Status of the transaction process: (1) Deal completed, (2) Deal pending, (3) Deal 
intended, (4) Deal withdrawn or (5) Other deal status 














































Notes: Our financial model quantifies the price effect by discounting reported average Ebitda Multiples by the coefficients from OLS regression shown in Table 12 and 






























1 TA+AA+ 20.04 1,186 15,923 31.60% 15.23 901 285 4,533,372
2 TA-AA+ 20.18 199 3,835 37.80% 14.64 144 55 209,186
19,758 4,742,559
per Transaction $m nominal  $         240.03 
per Transaction $m real  $         355.25 
